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The largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in his-
tory has renewed interest in filoviruses and has provided
an unprecedented impetus to the development of new
therapeutics and vaccines for this highly lethal infection.
Hemorrhagic fevers caused by Ebola and Marburghave no conflicts of interest
of Microbiology, LG-1 Block
m Road, Pok Fu Lam, Hong
m (S.C.-Y. Wong).
5.01.012
Taiwan LLC & Formosan Medicalvirusesdalso collectively known as filoviral hemorrhagic
fever (FHF)dpreviously caused dramatic, albeit limited,
outbreaks in central Africa. Their impact on global health
was rather small (except in the realm of biological war-
fare research) because of the high mortality rate, lack of
effective antiviral therapies and vaccines, and potential
for person-to-person transmission.1 The 2014 West African
outbreak of EVD proved that these filoviruses should no
longer be considered as merely regional problems. A short
review of EVD and its clinical relevance to the non-
endemic countries is presented. The current epidemic
is caused by Zaı¨re ebolavirus; however, references
will also be made to the related Marburgvirus, which
shares many virological, clinical, and epidemiological
characteristics.Association. All rights reserved.
Ebola virus disease 385Virology and pathogenesis
The order Mononegavirales consists of enveloped, non-
segmented, negative-sense, single-stranded RNA viruses.
The Family Filoviridae comprises three genera: Cuevavirus,
Ebolavirus, and Marburgvirus.2 In 2011, the sole species of
Cuevavirus, Lloviu cuevavirus, was described. It was
discovered during an investigation of massive die-offs of
Miniopterus schreibersii bats in France, Spain, and Portugal
in 2002; and the virus was detected in bat carcasses
collected from northern Spain.3 The genus Ebolavirus
(EBOV) includes five species, Bundibugyo ebolavirus
(BEBOV), Reston ebolavirus (REBOV), Sudan ebolavirus
(SEBOV), Taı¨ Forest ebolavirus (TAFV/CIEBOV; previously
called Ivory Coast ebolavirus or Coˆte d’Ivoire ebolavirus),
and Zaı¨re ebolavirus (ZEBOV). The genus Marburgvirus
consists of one species: Marburg marburgvirus (MARV).
The name “filovirus” describes a unique morphological
characteristic of the viruses. The virions are generally fila-
mentous (in Latin, filummeans “thread”) with a diameter of
approximately 80 nm and a highly variable length of
800e14,000 nm. They may also appear as branched fila-
ments, short rods, U-shaped, circular, or hairpin-shaped.4,5
The genomes of EBOV and MARV are approximately 19 kb
and consist of seven genes (from the 30 to 50 end): nucleo-
protein (NP), VP35, VP40, glycoprotein (GP), VP30, VP24,
and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (L).4,6 Ebolavirus ex-
presses an additional protein through transcriptional editing
of the GP gene. In addition to GP, a smaller secreted glyco-
protein (sGP) is produced and excreted extracellularly.4,7
At 20C, EBOV and MARV are stable and resist desicca-
tion, which probably explains their stability in aerosol
droplets.7,8 They are however inactivated by heat and
common disinfectants such as detergents, phenolics, and
hypochlorites.7 The usual heat treatment of clinical sam-
ples at 56C for 30 minutes may fail to render the specimen
noninfectious. Thermal inactivation at 60C for 60 minutes
or 75C for 30 minutes is necessary.9e11 Gamma irradiation
readily inactivates the filoviruses, although this method
may not be readily available in routine clinical or laboratory
settings.12Table 1 Filovirus genes and their functions.4,7,13e15,26,191,192
Viral genes and proteins Function in the viral life cycle
Nucleoprotein Viral nucleocapsid assembly; budd
VP35 Viral nucleocapsid assembly
VP40 (matrix protein) Viral nucleocapsid assembly; budd
structural integrity of viral partic
Glycoprotein GP: a transmembrane protein; vir
attachment to and entry into hos
Likely receptors: cell surface lect
VP30 RNA-binding protein, stabilizes na
activates RNA transcription; regul
replication cycle
VP24 (matrix protein) Viral assembly; budding
RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase (L)
Viral transcription
GP Z glycoprotein; NP Z nucleoprotein; sGP Z secreted glycoproteThe genetics and molecular biology of the filoviral
genome have been previously reviewed.4,7 In addition to
the essential functions for viral replication and assembly,
many viral proteins exert their effects on the host immune
system and may contribute to the pathogenesis of the
infection (Table 1).4,7,13e15,26,191,192 For example, VP35 and
VP24 inhibit the normal antiviral activities of type I in-
terferons at multiple steps of the pathway, whereas sGP
may contribute to immune evasion by absorbing anti-GP
antibodies (i.e., antigenic subversion).13e15 Because of
the essential roles of many viral proteins in replication and
assembly, some viral proteins (e.g., VP30 and VP35) are
potential targets for antiviral agent development.16,17
In recent years, the pathogenesis of FHF has been better
elucidated.18 Filoviruses are pantropic with the ability to
infect different host cell types. The initial cells in which the
viruses replicate are likely dendritic cells, macrophages,
monocytes, and Kupffer cells at the site of entry. A large
number of lectins (e.g., DC-SIGN and L-SIGN) and immu-
norecognition receptors [i.e., triggering receptors
expressed in myeloid cells (TREM)] can serve as receptors
for the viruses.19 After the initial multiplication in the
aforementioned cell types, the viruses are transported to
the reticuloendothelial system (e.g., lymph nodes, spleen,
liver) and other organs where infection of other cell types
occur. The resulting massive necrosis and end organ dam-
age are reflected in the histopathology of human and pri-
mate infection models with necrosis in the liver, kidneys,
lungs, lymphoid tissues, and other organs.20,21 In addition,
various mechanisms contribute to the development of
coagulopathy and disseminated intravascular coagulation,
which is a hallmark of viral hemorrhagic fevers. Patients
with FHF develop significant platelet dysfunction (which is
not merely accountable for by thrombocytopenia), and this
is contributed to by platelet activation and decreased
vascular endothelium production of prostacyclin.22 Another
important target in the pathogenesis of FHF is the endo-
thelium. Human and primate endothelial cells are suscep-
tible to infection by EBOV, although direct cyopathic
effects are not an important factor in the development of
vasculopathy and coagulopathy.23 The release of vasoactiveEffects on hosts
ing May be a main virulence mechanism
Type I interferon antagonist
ing;
les
al
t cells
ins
GP: induces proinflammatory cytokines
sGP: possibly contributes to immune
evasion by antigenic subversion
scent RNA;
ates the
Inhibits interferon signaling and activation
May be a main virulence mechanism
in.
386 S.S.-Y. Wong, S.C.-Y. Wongfactors (e.g., nitric oxide) or cytokines and chemokines
from monocytes and macrophages (e.g., tumor necrosis
factor-alpha, interferons, monocyte chemoattactant
protein-1, interleukin-8) could be important in the genesis
of vascular damage.23 The combined effects of increased
secretions of proinflammatory cytokines, activation of the
coagulation cascade, consumption and/or reduced pro-
duction of protein C, thrombocytopenia and platelet
dysfunction, hepatic damage with impaired production of
coagulation factors, and vascular damage contribute to the
development of coagulopathy in FHF.24
Protective humoral and cellular immune responses can
be demonstrated in patients who survive, and antibody
levels persist for years.25 In addition to the various immune
evasion mechanisms alluded to previously [e.g., binding of
anti-GP antibodies by sGP (i.e., immune subversion), sup-
pression of innate immune responses, and inhibition of
interferon pathways], other potential virulence and path-
ogenic mechanisms of filoviruses such as the NP and VP24
proteins have been identified.26 The generation of anti-
bodies towards GP is critical for the protective efficacy of
vaccines.27Epidemiology and transmission
Ebolavirus and MARV are geographically restricted to and
cause outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa; however, REBOV is
found in nonhuman primates and pigs in the Philippines
(Table 2).5,68,80,176,193,194 The first filovirus was discovered
in 1967 after an outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever
infection in Germany. This infection originated from Cer-
copithecus aethiops monkeys that were imported from
Uganda.28 In 1976, the first natural outbreak of ZEBOV
occurred in northern Zaı¨re (now called the Democratic
Republic of the Congo).29 In 1976, SEBOV was discovered in
an outbreak in Nzara in Sudan.30 In 2007e2008, BEBOV
caused an outbreak in Uganda, followed by another
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
2012.31,32 In 1994, TAFV was discovered in a Swiss biologist
who acquired the infection in the Republic of Coˆte d’Ivoire
(i.e., the Ivory Coast).33 In 1989, REBOV was first discovered
in monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) that were exported from
the Philippines to Reston, Virginia, USA The infected mon-
keys were subsequently exported to Italy (1992e1993) and
to Texas (1996). Cynomolgus macaques in the Philippines
are naturally infected, as are pigs. The REBOV virus appears
to be nonpathogenic to humans.34e36
Human filovirus infections are primary zoonotic diseases
with a high propensity for interpersonal transmission. The
primary animal reservoir of EBOV and MARV are bats
(especially fruit bats).37 Bats support long-term viral
replication without developing the disease.38 Virological
and serological studies have confirmed filoviral infection in
diverse bat species.37,39,40 In the Philippines, China, and
Bangladesh, there is also evidence of REBOV (and possibly
other filoviral) infection in bats.41e43 Cases of FHF have
been epidemiologically linked to contact with bat car-
casses, spelunking among tourists, and outbreaks among
gold miners who work in caves.44e46 Peak seasons of bat
MARV infection have been correlated with the incidence of
human “spillover“infections.47 Primates are also naturallyinfected with filoviruses, although they are likely to be
infected by natural reservoir hosts (e.g., bats) and are not
considered important reservoirs.48,49 Primates, neverthe-
less, remain important vectors for the introduction of the
disease into humans in rural Africa, and wild animal mor-
tality sometimes precede human outbreaks of EVD.50 Other
mammals that can be infected by EVD include pigs (espe-
cially by REBOV and ZEBOV) and dogs; however, their role in
causing human EVD outbreaks is uncertain.51e53
Human infections typically occur with a few patterns of
transmission. Inhabitants of endemic areas, especially in-
dividuals dwelling in forests with occupational exposure to
wild animals (e.g., hunters and people handling bushmeat),
may develop symptomatic or subclinical infections, pre-
sumably because of the exposure to animal reservoirs of the
virus. In some cases of human infection, a history of direct
exposure to animal carcasses (such as primates, bats,
duiker antelopes, and porcupines) or indirect exposure to
bats in caves has occurred.44e46,54,55 These single or mul-
tiple introductions to human populations may result in short
chains of human transmission. When FHF patients are
admitted to healthcare facilities where infection control
measures are inadequate, a large outbreak may occur with
transmission to other patients and healthcare workers.
Hospitals have been a major amplifying and disseminating
factor in many previous outbreaks of FHF in Africa.
Direct person-to-person transmission of EBOV and MARV
occurs via blood or body fluids by percutaneous inoculation
or by mucosal exposures.56e58 During an outbreak of SEBOV,
the virus was detected by viral culture or reverse tran-
scription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) in patients’
saliva, skin swab, stool, tears, breast milk, and semen, but
not in environmental samples.59 In view of the persistence
of the viruses in semen and breast milk at 91 days and 15
days, respectively, after illness onset,58,59 the use of con-
doms and withholding breastfeeding are recommended
during convalescence.
More than 80% of patients in the 1995 Kitwit outbreak in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo had secondary cases
in the household; the risk was highest for people with direct
physical contact with the body fluids of symptomatic pa-
tients and exposure to patients in the late stages of the
disease; this finding can be explained by the high viral load
at this phase of disease.58 Reusing needles or other medical
instruments without adequate sterilization, needle stick
injuries, lack of isolation facilities, and inadequate and
inappropriate use of personal protective equipment all
contribute to explosive hospital outbreaks. African burial
customs of washing dead bodies and transporting bodies
without barrier precautions further transmit the disease in
the community.29,58,60,61 Infected pigs can transmit REBOV
to nonhuman primates via the airborne route and
nonhuman primates can be infected experimentally by the
inhalation of droplets (droplet size of 0.8e1.2 mm),
although parenterally infected primates do not transmit
the infection via the airborne route.62e64 True airborne
transmission of EBOV between humans has likewise not
been documented. Up to 40% of patients in some EBOV
outbreaks may have no known contact or exposure history,
although it remains unclear whether this is because of
fomites, true airborne transmission, or inadequate
investigation.57,58,61,65
Table 2 Outbreaks of human filovirus infection.5,68,80,176,193,194
Virus strain Year Location No. of cases Case-fatality
rate (%)
Endemic situation
Zaı¨re ebolavirus 1976 Zaı¨re (now called the
Democratic Republic of
the Congo)
318 88
1977 Zaı¨re 1 100
1994 Gabon 52 60
1995 Zaı¨re 315 81
1996 Gabon 37 57
1996e1997 Gabon 60 74
2001e2002 Gabon 65 82
2001e2002 Republic of the Congo 57 75
2002e2003 Republic of the Congo 143 89
2003 Republic of the Congo 35 83
2007 Democratic Republic of
the Congo
264 71
2008e2009 Democratic Republic of
the Congo
32 47
2014 (as of January 14,
2015)
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Nigeria, Senegal,
Mali
20,741 40
2014 Democratic Republic of
the Congo
66 74
Sudan ebolavirus 1976 Sudan 284 53
1979 Sudan 34 65
2000e2001 Uganda 425 53
2004 Sudan 17 41
2011 Uganda 1 100
2012 Uganda 11 36
2012e2013 Uganda 6 50
Bundibugyo ebolavirus 2007e2008 Uganda 149 25
2012 Democratic Republic of
the Congo
36 36
Marburgvirus 1980 Kenya 2 50
1987 Kenya 1 100
1998e2000 Democratic Republic of
the Congo
154 83
2004e2005 Angola 252 90
2007 Uganda 4 25
2012 Uganda 15 27
2014 Uganda 1 100
Imported, nosocomial, or laboratory-acquired in nonendemic countries
Zaı¨re ebolavirus 1996 South Africa ex-Gabon 2 50
1996 Russia 1 (laboratory accident) 100
2004 Russia 1 (laboratory accident) 100
2014 (as of 29 October
2014)
USA ex Liberia and
Guinea
2 50
2014 (as of 29 October
2014)
USA (healthcare workers) 2 0
2014 (as of 29 October
2014)
Spain ex-Sierra Leone 1 100
2014 (as of 29 October
2014)
Spain (healthcare
worker)
1 0
2014 (as of January 14,
2015)
UK ex-Sierra Leone 1 0
Sudan ebolavirus 1976 England 1 (laboratory accident) 0
Taı¨ Forest ebolavirus 1994 Switzerland ex-Coˆte
d’Ivoire
1 0
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued )
Virus strain Year Location No. of cases Case-fatality
rate (%)
Reston ebolavirus (based
on seroprevalence
studies)
1989e1990, 1996 USA 0e3% seropositive (188
cases with exposure to
monkeys tested)
0
1992 Italy 0% seropositive (16 cases
with exposure to
monkeys tested)
0
1898e1990, 1993, 1996 Philippines 0e17% seropositive (458
cases with exposure to
monkeys tested)
0
2008e2009 Philippines 6% seropositive (332
cases with exposure to
pigs tested)
0
Marburgvirus 1967 Germany, Yugoslavia 31 (exposure to monkeys
from Uganda)
23
1975 South Africa ex-
Zimbabwe
3 33
1990 Russia 1 (laboratory accident) 100
2008 USA ex-Uganda 1 0
2008 Netherlands ex-Uganda 1 100
UK Z United Kingdom; USA Z United States of America.
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unique in two aspects: (1) its unprecedented scale and (2)
its origination in West Africa (Guinea) rather than in central
Africa. The first case occurred in Guinea in February 2014,
and subsequently spread to the African countries of Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali. In October 2014,
the World Health Organization declared the epidemic over
in Senegal and Nigeria.66,67 Further epidemiological in-
vestigations suggested the index case was probably a 2-
year-old child who died on December 6, 2013 in southern
Guinea.60 The infection was subsequently transmitted from
the child to family members, a village midwife, and a
healthcare worker; some of these patients later caused
outbreaks in different areas of Guinea. Ebola virus disease
has caused infection in 838 local healthcare workers of
whom 495 (59%) workers died (as of January 7, 2015); four
of these infected healthcare workers were citizens of the
United States of America, Spain, and the United Kingdom
who returned to their respective countries for further
management.68 As of September 14, 2014, the basic
reproduction number in this epidemic ranged from 1.71 to
2.02, which is similar to previous estimates of 1.34 to
2.70.69e71 The virus strain causing the current outbreak is
ZEBOV, which shows 97% identity to the EBOV strains that
caused outbreaks in Gabon and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in 2002.60,72 A concurrent but unrelated outbreak
of EVD occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
from August 2014 to November 2014; it involved 66 cases
and 49 deaths. The index case had a history of exposure to
bushmeat.73,74
Clinical manifestations
Filoviral hemorrhagic fever is characteristically a highly
fatal disease. The average caseefatality ratio of FHF inpreviously reported outbreaks caused by ZEBOV, SEBOV,
BEBOV, and MARV in endemic countries (Table 2) are 0.72
(range, 0.40e0.89), 0.50 (range, 0.36e0.65), 0.31 (range,
0.25e0.36), and 0.55 (range, 0.25e0.90), respectively
(excluding situations that involved only one case). Reston
ebolavirus causes asymptomatic infection among contacts
of infected primates or pigs.34 On the other hand,
asymptomatic infection was described in 1996, as evi-
denced by seroconversion in 46% of close contacts of pa-
tients, in two ZEBOV outbreaks in Gabon.75 In 64% (7/11)
of the seroconverted asymptomatic contacts, RT-PCR of
the peripheral blood mononuclear cells was positive for
the virus, and viremia persisted up to 2 weeks in some
contacts. Another line of evidence for asymptomatic in-
fections comes from seroprevalence studies in Africa, in
which 2.2e15.3% of the surveyed population in central
Africa was seropositive for EBOV with the seroprevalence
consistently higher among forest-dwelling populations and
hunters.76e78
The incubation period of EVD varies from 2 days to 21
days (commonly, 6e10 days), but a recent analysis of the
cases in the 1995 ZEBOV outbreak in Kitwit suggested that
the mean incubation period was 12.7 days, and the
maximum incubation period was up to 25 days.79 A biphasic
illness has been described with an apparent remission of
1e2 days in between.5,6,80e82 The disease usually begins
abruptly with nonspecific symptoms such as fever (93e95%
of patients, ut infra), malaise (85e95%), headache
(52e74%), sore throat, odynophagia or dysphagia
(56e58%), hiccoughs (5e17%), and nonproductive cough
(7e26%). Abdominal pain (62e68%) or nausea and vomiting
(68e73%) often precede the onset of diarrhea (84e86%),
usually 5 days after the onset of illness). The abdomen can
be tender on palpation. In the absence of supportive
therapy, diarrhea and vomiting may lead to fluid depletion
Ebola virus disease 389and electrolyte disturbances such as hypokalemia. Other
symptoms include arthralgia or myalgia (50e79%), chest
pain (5e10%), and conjunctival injection (42e47%). A
diffuse erythematous rash (14e16%) appears towards the
end of the 1st week which will later desquamate. The non-
pruritic rash appears first on the trunk, and then spreads to
the entire body with sparing of the face. Three early
symptoms of bilateral conjunctival injection, rash, and
sore throat are suggestive of EVD in the differential diag-
nosis.82 After the appearance of the rash, patients may
either gradually recover or, in severe cases, progress over
7e14 days to the full-blown hemorrhagic fever syndrome
with petechiae (8%), gum bleeding (0e15%), melaena
(8e16%), hemoptysis (0e11%), hematemesis (0e13%),
epistaxis (0e2%), hematuria (7e16%), menorrhagia,
bleeding at venipuncture sites (5e8%), and show features
of disseminated intravascular coagulation.82,83 The typical
hemorrhagic fever picture, however, occurs only in
approximately 40% of the patients (range, 17e71%).82,84
Other manifestations in the late stage include evidence
of multiorgan failure such as circulatory shock, obtunda-
tion, tachypnea, renal shutdown, convulsion, delirium,
and coma. Fever is often absent at this stage. Death often
occurs between Days 6 and 16, whereas patients who sur-
vive will show improvement around Days 6 to 11.6 Intra-
uterine death is common in pregnant patients. Mortality
among pregnant women is substantial but may not be
significantly higher than for nonpregnant patients; and
pregnant women do not have an increased susceptibility to
the infection.85,86 Survivors tend to improve from the 2nd
week of illness. They make a slow recovery during which
arthralgia (which could be asymmetric and migratory and
often involves the large joints), uveitis, conjunctivitis,
orchitis, parotitis, hearing loss, and tinnitus may
occur.80,82 Chronic infection by filoviruses has not been
documented, but male patients may shed the virus in the
semen for 40e91 days after the onset of illness, and the
transmission of MARV has occurred via sexual
intercourse.58,59,87,88
Common laboratory findings include lymphopenia,
thrombocytopenia, elevated aminotransferases, hyper-
proteinemia, proteinuria, and prolonged prothrombin and
activated partial thromboplastin time.6 With the progres-
sion of disease, evidence of disseminated intravascular
coagulation and renal failure will appear. Disease progres-
sion is also associated with worsening lymphopenia and
rising antigenemia.89
Compared to survivors, patients with fatal EVD are more
likely to have tachypnea.82 Patients with disease also have
a significantly higher level of viremia and a much weaker
humoral immune response to the infection.90 Significant
differences in a number of cytokine and chemokine levels
have also been detected between patients with nonfatal
and fatal EVD; in particular, the levels of many proin-
flammatory cytokines and nitric oxide are higher in non-
survivors (with the possible exception of BEBOV), whereas
the level of T cells and CD8þ T cells were lower.25,89,91e94 A
high viral load is of prognostic significance. In SEBOV FHF,
patients with fatal cases had an average of 108e109 (up to
1010) copies of RNA/mL of serum, compared to the
approximately 107 copies of RNA/mlL of serum in survi-
vors.90 Patients with MARV FHF likewise have high levels ofviremia in blood with a median level of 4.1  104 (range,
2.62  102e9.33  108)/mL of serum serum.95Laboratory diagnosis
There are no pathognomonic signs or symptoms in the early
stages of EVD. The most useful history is epidemiological
linkage to possible cases by travel history or by contact with
known or suspected cases. Laboratory investigations are
necessary to confirm the diagnosis. Other differential di-
agnoses (vide infra) should be excluded, as appropriate.
All clinical specimens must be handled with great care
from their collection to transport and testing in the labo-
ratories. Laboratory-acquired infection of EBOV has
occurred via percutaneous exposures.96 Marburgvirus re-
tains its infectivity in dried blood for at least 5 days.11
Filoviruses can be inactivated by heat [60C for 60 mi-
nutes or 75C for 30 minutes; or 60C for 15 minutes in the
presence of 0.2% (final concentration) sodium dodecyl sul-
fate or 0.1% (final concentration) Tween 20] or inactivated
by 1% sodium deoxycholate solution, acetone, diethyl
ether, 1% formalin, methanol, sodium hypochlorite,
glutaraldehyde, 2% peracetic acid, phenolic disinfectants,
and osmium tetroxide (used in fixation for electron micro-
scopy).11 Ultraviolet light is an effective means for surface
disinfection. Depending on the type of specimen and
testing methodology, treatment of the sample with either
Triton X-100, Tween 20, sodium dodecyl sulfate, beta-pro-
piolactone, chloramine B, or 3% acetic acid (pH 2.5) should
be done before routine hematological, biochemical, and
serological testing.11 Heat inactivation is recommended for
blood sodium, potassium, magnesium, urate, urea, creati-
nine, bilirubin, glucose, and C-reactive protein; however,
other methods of inactivation would be necessary for cal-
cium, phosphate, albumin, transaminases, gamma-
glutamyltransferase, and creatine kinase determination.11
Standard virological techniques also apply to the diag-
nosis of FHF. These include viral culture, electron micro-
scopy, serological tests using antigen or antibody detection,
and nucleic acid amplification.5,97 Filoviruses can be culti-
vated from clinical specimens (especially blood and liver
samples); however, because of the associated biohazards, a
viral culture is notdand should not bedroutinely per-
formed, except in facilities that can handle biosafety level
4 agents. Electron microscopy, which has excellent speci-
ficity because of the unique morphology of filoviruses, is
also not routinely performed because of biosafety consid-
erations, limited availability of electron microscope facil-
ities in routine diagnostic settings, and the relatively high
viral load necessary for visualization.
The detection antibodies [e.g., immunoglobulin M (IgM) or
immunoglobulin G (IgG)] is commonly achieved using immu-
nofluorescent assays and enzyme-linked immunoassay
(ELISA) against recombinant NP, GP, VP40, VP35, or VP30
antigens.97e99 The appearance of IgM and IgG antibodies oc-
curs at approximately 2 days and 6e18 days, respectively,
after the onset of illness.6 Various antigen detection assays
have been developed for the diagnosis of FHF and some have
been used in field situations. The techniques include antigen-
captureELISA, immunofluorescentassay, dot-immunobinding
assay, immunofiltration assaywith different genus-specific or
390 S.S.-Y. Wong, S.C.-Y. Wongspecies-specific reactivity towards common targets such NP,
GP, and VP40 proteins.97,100,101 A practical limitation of these
serological assays is the limited availability of these tests in
laboratories in nonendemic countries.
Nucleic acid amplification is the diagnostic test of choice
because of its high sensitivity (especially in the early phase
of illness); its ability to differentiate between different
agents of viral hemorrhagic fever; and its relatively lower
biohazard, if the viruses are appropriately inactivated; and
because antigen and antibody assays are often unavailable
in laboratories in nonendemic countries. When the viral
load is determined by quantitative assays, prognostic in-
formation can also be obtained. The most commonly used
test is RT-PCR. A reverse transcriptioneloop-mediated
isothermal amplification assay has also been developed for
EBOV and MARV.102,103 All diagnostic nucleic acid amplifi-
cation tests must be adequately validated before being
used clinically. If appropriately validated, the use of
multiplex PCR/RT-PCR allows simultaneous detection of
multiple pathogens that cause hemorrhagic fever.104,105
The provision of nucleic acid amplification tests should
preferably be centralized in national or regional reference
laboratories to ensure adequate biosafety containment and
quality of results. The RNA of EBOV can be detected in the
sera by RT-PCR 24e48 hours earlier than by antigen cap-
ture; in some studies, it is detectable on Day 1 of the
illness.6,90 However, the viral load gradually reaches its
peak at approximately 3 e7 days after the onset of the
disease.90 Retesting is therefore necessary if RT-PCR is
initially negative but clinical suspicion is high, especially
when the first sample was obtained within 3 days of the
onset of disease. Blood is the most commonly used sample
for RT-PCR. Oral fluid specimens can be a viable alternative
to blood samples for RT-PCR in situations in which blood
taking may be difficult or infeasible.106 Common targets for
nucleic acid amplification include the L, GP, and NP
genes.89,90,95,107,108Clinical management and vaccine development
Treatment of FHF is primarily supportive owing to the un-
availability of approved, specific antiviral agents. Concur-
rent infections such as malaria or bacterial sepsis should be
treated, as appropriate. Fluid and electrolyte replacement,
blood product transfusion, renal replacement therapy, and
ventilatory support such as extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation should be administered, as necessary.6,109
Various experimental therapeutic approaches have been
attempted in experimental animals or clinically; however,
no randomized controlled trials prove their efficacy. Ex-
amples include recombinant inhibitor of factor VII
(rNAPc2), recombinant human activated protein C, and
interferon-beta.110e112 As in cases of other severe viral in-
fections, convalescent plasma from recovered patients has
been used to treat FHF. This was deployed with apparent
benefits in the 1995 EVD outbreak in Kitwit.113 The World
Health Organization (WHO) published a guideline on the
collection and preparation of convalescent plasma for use
in the outbreak situation; however, the WHO recognizes the
uncertainties in the efficacy of this treatment.114 Cocktails
of monoclonal antibodies have similarly been used recentlywith some success in reducing the mortality of EBOV
infection in nonhuman primates. These antibodies have
been produced in plants and in mice.115e117 Based on these
studies, an optimized cocktail of plant-derived monoclonal
antibodies, called the ZMapp, was produced; it protected
100% of rhesus macaques infected up to 5 days with
EBOV.118 These antibodies have been used experimentally
for treating human EBOV patients in the 2014 West African
outbreak, although the actual benefit to human EVD re-
mains to be confirmed.
A second approach to the treatment of FHF lies in the
development of specific antiviral agents. A current nucle-
otide analogue is favipiravir (T-705), which was developed
and approved in Japan for the treatment of influenza.
Favipiravir inhibits viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase of
the influenza virus. It was subsequently found to exhibit
in vitro antiviral activities against certain other RNA viruses
such as bunyaviruses, arenaviruses, flaviviruses, alphavi-
ruses, norovirus, and EBOV.119e123 Animal studies also
demonstrate the efficacy of favipiravir in the treatment of
Junı´n virus, arenavirus, and EBOV hemorrhagic fevers, and
the drug was used to treat human EVD in the 2014 West
African epidemic.124e128 A dosing regimen of favipiravir for
use in a clinical trial for the treatment of EVD has been
published.129 Another nucleotide analogue, brincidofovir (a
lipid conjugate of cidofovir), was previously developed to
treat infections due to DNA viruses such as adenoviruses,
herpesviruses, and orthopoxviruses; the drug was granted
Emergency Investigational New Drug Applications in
October 2014 by the United States (US) Food and Drug
Administration for evaluation in EVD treatment, and a
clinical trial was started in January 2015 in Monrovia,
Liberia.130e132 The nucleoside analogue BCX4430 was
recently shown to inhibit RNA polymerase of negative- and
positive-sense RNA viruses via chain termination effects.133
Its in vivo activity against MARV was demonstrated in
guinea pigs and cynomolgus macaques. The development of
BCX4430 for human clinical trials will require a long time.
Another approach involves the screening of currently
available nonantimicrobials for their activities on filovi-
ruses. Compounds such as selective estrogen receptor
modulators (e.g., clomiphene, toremifene), amiodarone,
dronedarone, and verapamil have antifilovirus activity in
cell cultures and/or murine models.134,135 In addition, RNA
interference using small interfering RNAs provide post-
exposure protection of animals infected with EBOV and
MARV.136e138
A third approach to the specific management of filoviral
infections explores the potential of postexposure prophy-
laxis. Such regimens would benefit exposed healthcare
workers and other social contacts, and laboratory staff
experiencing accidental exposures. Protective immunity
towards filoviruses does exist, as demonstrated in the
possible benefits of convalescent plasma and animal studies,
in which humoral immunity (i.e., IgG) protects against EBOV
infection.139 Animals studies also confirm that passive im-
munization by neutralizing monoclonal antibodies is pro-
tective in primates.140 Previously examined filovirus vaccine
candidates that elicit protective humoral immunity experi-
mentally include EBOV-like particles containing GP, NP,
and VP40; replication-deficient EBOV mutants that lack the
VP30 gene; and EBOV GP-containing fragment or fusion
Ebola virus disease 391protein.141e144 A phase 1 clinical trial has tested DNA vac-
cines encoding the glycoproteins of EBOV and MARV.145
One of the most promising vaccine candidates for filo-
viruses is the recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus-based
vaccine system that expresses filoviral GP. This system
elicits protective immunity against ZEBOV, SEBOV, BEBOV,
and MARV; it also offers substantial postexposure prophy-
laxis in primate and murine models.146e152 The vaccine was
used for postexposure prophylaxis in a laboratory staff
person who sustained a needle stick injury with ZEBOV in
2009.153 A similar vaccine system used replication-defec-
tive recombinant adenovirus that expressed EBOV GP was
protective in animal models.154,155 Phase 1 clinical trials of
the vesicular stomatitis virus-based and adenovirus-based
vaccines began in late 2014.156
Ebola virus disease as a problem in
nonendemic countries: issues on prevention
and control
The containment of FHF outbreaks in endemic countries re-
quires substantial resources in coordination between the
public health system and other authorities of the countries,
surveillance of the disease, education and engagement of
local citizens, isolation and treatment facilities, and labo-
ratory support.157,158 These requirements are often beyond
the capability of endemic countries. Significant interna-
tional assistance is usually needed to contain major out-
breaks. Thediscussion on thesepublic health issues is beyond
the scope of this article. For health authorities in non-
endemic countries, a preparedness plan for emerging in-
fections is an indispensable component of the public health
system. The development and adoption of preparedness and
response plans for emerging infectious diseases are first
fostered in anticipation of pandemic influenza. The out-
breaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
pandemic influenza A (i.e., H1N1), Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and, more recently,
avian influenza A (i.e., H7N9) and EVD underscore the
importance of such pre-emptive plans in preventing or
mitigating the effects of disease transmission.159,160 The
details may vary, depending on the nature of the pathogens;
however, key components in public health response include
risk assessment; communication and education; establishing
a rapid response team and management team to coordinate
responses between different government ministries; moni-
toring and surveillance; providing adequate facilities and
supplies for quarantine and infection control; developing
laboratory diagnostics; and where appropriate, antimicro-
bial and vaccination policies, and/or stockpiling.159,161
For clinicians in nonendemic countries, FHF will mostly
be encountered in travelers returning from endemic areas.
The 2003 SARS epidemic and 2009 influenza A (H1N1)
pandemic demonstrated the efficiency of international
traveldespecially air traveldin the global spread of in-
fectious diseases.162,163 As a continent, Africa has a rela-
tively small number of international travelers (only Oceania
has a smaller number of international tourist arrivals),
although the exportation of FHF to nonendemic countries is
well documented in the present epidemic.164 It is tempting
to consider establishing travel restrictions to limit thespread of EVD outside of Africa; however, the actual benefit
of such policies is limited.165 At the time of this writing, the
WHO has issued no travel restrictions to the affected
countries. However, it is prudent to issue health warnings
to potential visitors to affected countries. Pretravel edu-
cation on transmission routes, precautionary measures,
self-monitoring of signs and symptoms, and availability of
medical care in destination countries should be provided.
As in other subspecialties of travel medicine, the visiting
friends and relatives (VFRs) are at particularly high risk of
contracting travel-related infections.166 Despite the fact
that publicity and health alerts are often announced to the
general public, VFRs do not always receive the necessary
information on the risks because of cultural differences,
language barriers, or different perceptions. Hence, efforts
must be targeted to VFRs (especially African communities
in this context) to reduce the risk of disease importation.
Remote infrared thermal scanners have been used as a
means of fever screening at airports in some countries. The
practice first gained popularity during the 2003 SARS
epidemic, and was subsequently evaluated in the 2009
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.167e170 To a lesser extent, this
method has also been used for the screening of other
febrile illness such as dengue fever.171 Infrared thermal
scanning is relatively popular in Asian countries such as
Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong, and it is usually used
in conjunction with health questionnaires for self-reported
symptoms such as fever and travel history. The tympanic
temperature would be measured for suspected cases. The
sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive value of
thermal scanning are affected by a variety of factors such
as the instruments used, the threshold temperature, the
part of the body being measured, the distance of the in-
struments from the individual, and the previous use of
antipyretic agents. Patients in the incubation period of an
infection obviously will not be detected by this screening
method. Despite the relatively low sensitivity, specificity,
and positive predictive values of infrared thermal scanning,
some investigators consider it a useful adjunctive measure
for border screening, although it cannot be relied on as the
sole method for screening.167e170
Contact tracing must be promptly initiated for any po-
tential contacts of returned travelers diagnosed with a
communicable infectious disease such as EVD. Detailed
guidance on contact tracing for patients with EVD and other
forms of viral hemorrhagic fevers have been pub-
lished.172,173 All suspected contacts must undergo individ-
ual risk assessments, based on the travel history, the
epidemic situation in the affected countries, and the na-
ture of potential exposure before and during travel.173
Detailed instructions and information must be provided to
the contacts, who will then be monitored for fever and the
development of symptoms. The monitoring may be per-
formed in the community or within healthcare facilities,
during which some limitations indor at least, advice
againstdthe freedom to travel within the community or
country may be necessary and interference of daily activ-
ities may be inevitable.174 Close and empathetic liaison
between the contacts and health departments is essential
to ensure compliance with monitoring and to minimize
psychological impacts. A preparedness plan for contact
tracing, disease surveillance, clinical management,
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in place to manage such incidents in nonendemic countries.
Hemorrhagic fever remains an uncommon cause of fever
in returned travelers, although it is severe clinically and has
substantial public health implications. The risk of FHF in
returned travelers is low. Ten cases of Marburg hemorrhagic
fever were reported from 1967 to 2012, and all patients had
a travel history to Africa.175 Cases of imported EVD
(excluding the nonpathogenic REBOV) were described in
South Africa in 1996 (ZEBOV) and in Switzerland in 1994
(TAFV).176 Other causes of fever in such settings must be
excluded by appropriate laboratory investigations. These
include (depending on the itinerary and exposure history)
other causes of fever with or without hemorrhagic pre-
sentations such as meningococcal infections, severe sepsis
due to other bacterial infections (including rare infections
such as anthrax and plague as guided by the clinical picture
and exposure history), leptospirosis, typhoid and other
causes of enteric fever, rickettsioses, malaria, trypanoso-
miasis, visceral leishmaniasis, dengue fever, and yellow
fever. In particular, malaria (which is a very common
treatable cause of fever in returned travelers and is
endemic in sub-Saharan Africa) must be excluded by
appropriate testing. Depending on the travel destination,
other causes of viral hemorrhagic fever have to be consid-
ered such as Lassa fever, Hantavirus infection, Crimean-
Congo hemorrhagic fever, and Rift Valley fever. The
travel history should also include human contacts with sick
individuals in the community (e.g., attending local fu-
nerals) or in healthcare facilities (as in the case of volun-
teer workers).84
Another important exposure history is interaction with
bats and other wild animals (especially primates). For
example, a history of spelunking has resulted in FHF among
local citizens and foreign visitors. Cases of Marburg hem-
orrhagic fever have occurred after exposure of visitors to
bats in caves in Kenya and Uganda.177,178
When FHF is suspected based on travel and/or exposure
histories, pre-emptive isolation is essential to minimize the
risk of subsequent interpersonal spread, until the diagnosis
is excluded. The routes of transmission of filoviruses are
well documented. Transmission can be interrupted, pro-
vided that proper infection control and public health
measures are implemented. Detailed infection control
guidelines on caring for patients with FHF have been pub-
lished.57,179e182 In essence, the principles of isolation and
use of personal protective equipment are not significantly
different from standard precautions and transmission-
based precautions (i.e., contact, droplet, and airborne)
that are universally practiced in healthcare facilities.
However, numerous studies and reviews have confirmed
that the compliance with the choice and use of personal
protective equipment among healthcare workers are
almost always suboptimal.183e185 Essential factors that
ensure the optimal implementation of infection control
protocols are adequate training of healthcare workers on
isolation procedures and on the appropriate use of personal
protective equipment, preferably by interactive training
with clear instructions; adequate manpower and organiza-
tional support; and the availability of timely and adequate
guidance and support.186e188 Such training should not be
limited to staff working in clinical areas; it must alsoinclude other healthcare workers such as laboratory
workers and paramedical personnel. The key elements of
infection control consist of patient placement (e.g., isola-
tion facilities), strict adherence to hand hygiene (e.g., the
WHO’s “five moments for hand hygiene”), proper use of
personal protective equipment such as gloves (e.g., double
gloves in special circumstances), waterproof gowns, respi-
ratory protection (e.g., surgical masks, respirators during
aerosol-generating procedures), eye protection, rubber
boots, and safe handling of sharp objects.55 Support staff
engaged in environmental disinfection, funerals, and burial
services must also be adequately trained on the proper use
of personal protective equipment and chemical disinfec-
tants, and on the handling of human remains to ensure
adequate disinfection and minimize the risk of accidental
exposure to the virus.55,189,190
Conclusion
Filoviral hemorrhagic fevers are uncommon, but they pose
real clinical and public health threats to countries outside
endemic areas. The routes of transmission, clinical mani-
festations, and infection control measures are well docu-
mented. Prevention of secondary transmission is possible,
provided that cases are promptly identified, and standard
isolation and precautionary measures are strictly followed.
As in cases of pandemic influenza or other epidemic-prone
infections, a preparedness plan is essential to cope with the
importation of the diseases and limit their subsequent
spread. To minimize the risk of disease importation, it is
essential to have a concerted program to engage VFRs and
other at-risk travelers by community health education and
advisories. The current EVD outbreak provides an oppor-
tunity to evaluate new therapeutic and prophylactic stra-
tegies, whereas their actual value of these strategies in
controlling the current and future epidemics require
detailed clinical evaluations.
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